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I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1996, the United States Congress passed Public Law 98-602,1
which appropriated $100,000 to the purchase of real property on behalf
of the Wyandotte Tribe (“the Tribe”).2 The Tribe intended to use these
funds to acquire a parcel of land in downtown Kansas City, Kansas, (the
“Shriner Tract” or “the Tract”) with the purpose of building and
operating a gaming facility.3 After the United States Secretary of the
Interior published notice of intent to take the land into trust on behalf of
the Tribe, the Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri, the Iowa Tribe of Kansas
and Nebraska, and the Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, along with
the Governor of Kansas (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”), sued under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA),4 alleging that the funds used to
purchase the Tract were not exclusively taken from the Public Law 98602 funds allocated for this purpose.5 According to the Plaintiffs, if the
Tribe had used funds other than those which Congress had allocated, the
Secretary’s acquisition of the Tract would have been improper under the
APA.6
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1 98 Stat. 3149 (1984), entitled “An Act to provide for the use and distribution of
certain funds awarded the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma and to restore certain mineral
rights to the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation.”
2 Iowa Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska v. Salazar, 607 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th Cir.
2010).
3
Governor of Kansas v. Kempthorne, 516 F.3d 833, 835 (10th Cir. 2008).
4 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1994).
5 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1228.
6 Id.
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While this litigation was pending, the Tribe purchased the Shriner
Tract, and the Secretary of the Interior took it into trust.7 Although the
district court had issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the
Secretary from doing so, the order was dissolved on appeal and the
Secretary went forward with the plan.8 Eventually the trial court entered
partial summary judgment for the defendants and remanded the case to
the Secretary, who determined that the Tribe had used only Public Law
98-602 funds in the purchase and closed the case.9
The interested parties filed a second suit challenging these actions
under the Quiet Title Act (QTA),10 which provides the only means by
which a claimant can challenge the federal government’s title to real
property.11 The Tenth Circuit, however, barred the Plaintiffs from
bringing this action, reasoning that Congress had not waived the United
States’ sovereign immunity under the QTA.12 The Supreme Court had
previously held sovereign immunity under the QTA to apply to any
challenge to the United States’ title in Indian trust land regardless of
whether a given plaintiff had characterized his action as seeking to quiet
title,13 so long as the relief sought involved either removal of land that
the government currently holds in trust, or otherwise encumbering that
land.14
The Plaintiffs then successfully moved to reopen the original action
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).15 Here, the
Plaintiffs argued that the court should only have addressed the sovereign
immunity issue at the inception of the action, when the Secretary had not
yet taken the Tract into trust.16 The district court, however, rejected this
argument and found for the defendants, holding that the sovereign
immunity issue must be reassessed with new factual developments in the
case, and can be implicated at any stage of the litigation.17 Accordingly,
the court dismissed this suit as well, again basing its decision on the lack
of waiver of sovereign immunity under the QTA.18
7

Id.
Id.
9 Id. at 1229 (citing Kempthorne, 516 F.3d at 838).
10 28 U.S.C. § 2409a.
11 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1230 (citing Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. &
Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983)).
12 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1229 (citing Kempthorne, 516 F.3d at 841–46).
13 Id. (citing Neighbors for Rational Dev., Inc. v. Norton, 379 F.3d 956, 961 (10th
Cir. 2004)).
14 Id. (citing Kempthorne, 516 F.3d at 842; Neighbors, 379 F.3d at 961–962)).
15 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6).
16 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1230.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1229.
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II. ISSUE
When the Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s ruling, the Tenth
Circuit confronted the question of whether the court should assess waiver
of sovereign immunity only once at the time a plaintiff files his
complaint, or whether it may also revisit the question after filing.19 If
sovereign immunity were only a bar to the initial filing of a complaint,
then this case could proceed.20 However, because the United States now
held the land in trust, if the sovereign immunity inquiry were ongoing
during the entire pendency of a lawsuit, it would be barred under the
QTA.21
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Tenth Circuit noted a split among the circuits on this particular
issue. On the one hand, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits applied a “time-offiling” rule, which dictated “the presence of a waiver of sovereign
immunity [under the QTA] should be determined as of the date the
complaint was filed.”22 On the other side was the First Circuit, which
took the position that sovereign immunity could be established during the
pendency of a suit even though the doctrine was inapplicable at its
inception.23
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN IOWA TRIBE OF KANSAS AND
NEBRASKA V. SALAZAR
The court began its analysis by stating that the time-of-filing rule
finds strong support in the diversity jurisdiction context.24 In such
situations, courts have no power to enjoin litigants from moving freely
between states for the sole purpose of maintaining the requisite diversity
of citizenship between the parties to sustain the courts’ jurisdiction.25
Therefore, a time-of-filing rule makes sense with regard to maintaining
diversity jurisdiction during the course of an action and preventing
jurisdictional manipulation by the parties. In contrast, courts had only
very infrequently applied a time-of-filing rule to federal question cases

19

Id. at 1232.
Id.
21 Id.
22 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1236 (citing Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d
661, 665 (9th Cir. 1981); Delta Savings & Loan Ass’n v. IRS, 847 F.2d 248, 249 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1988)).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1233 (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 583
(2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
25 Id.
20
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with the sole exception of removal cases, which involve high potential
for manipulation.26 Based upon this analysis, the court rejected the
Plaintiffs’ argument that prior applications of a time-of-filing rule
controlled.27
The Tenth Circuit then discussed an early Supreme Court case
addressing the precise question of whether courts must address sovereign
immunity at the time of filing.28 In Beers v. Arkansas,29 Beers sued
Arkansas for interest on state bonds that he held.30 While Beers’s suit
was pending, the Arkansas legislature passed an act requiring state bond
claimants to show the disputed bonds to the court, or else their case
would be dismissed.31 Beers could not produce the bonds, so the court
dismissed his action pursuant to the newly-enacted law.32 When he
appealed his case to the Supreme Court, it was held that the sovereign
waives its immunity—which is, after all, “altogether voluntary”—
according to its own terms and conditions, and may withdraw that
immunity “whenever it may suppose that justice to the public requires
it.”33 The fact that the legislature “might have repealed the prior law
altogether, and put an end to the jurisdiction of their courts in suits
against the State, if they had thought proper to do so” further bolstered
this conclusion. 34
The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the purpose behind the QTA’s
nonwaiver of sovereign immunity in the Indian trust context was to
preserve the integrity of the United States’ obligations to American
Indian tribes and prevent adverse claimants from intermeddling in this
relationship.35 In order to avoid subjecting these lands to such adverse
claims without the consent of the tribes for whom they are being held in
trust, Congress determined that the waiver under the QTA, which applies
in other contexts, should not apply here.36
Moreover, the court noted that the United States did not intend its
waiver of immunity under the APA, which applied at this suit’s
inception, to “swallow other statutory regimes.”37 In fact, to the
26 Id. (citing Kabakjian v. United States, 267 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2001); Connectu,
LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 92 (1st Cir. 2008)).
27 Id.
28 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1233.
29 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857).
30 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1233 (citing Beers, 61 U.S. at 528).
31 Id. (citing Beers, 61 U.S. at 528).
32 Id. (citing Beers, 61 U.S. at 528).
33 Id. (citing Beers, 61 U.S. at 529).
34 Id. (citing Beers, 61 U.S. at 530).
35 Id. at 1237.
36 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1237.
37 Id.
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contrary, Congress had made clear that nothing in the APA “confers
authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit
expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”38 With these
considerations in mind, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the sovereign
immunity inquiry was ongoing rather than simply taking place at the
time of filing.39
The court summarily rejected three of the Plaintiffs’ other
arguments. With regard to the Plaintiffs’ argument that the sovereign
immunity question need not be addressed because this was an officer suit
against the Secretary of the Interior rather than the United States itself,
the court held that to accept such argument view would render the QTA’s
Indian lands exception “nugatory,” and therefore rejected this
contention.40 The court also rejected the argument that its 1996 stay of
the temporary restraining order could serve to retain jurisdiction where a
sovereign immunity bar now applied.41 The court stated that it intended
that stay to preserve only the question of whether gaming would be
permitted on the Tract and was “simply irrelevant” to the sovereign
immunity question.42 Lastly, the court rejected the argument that equity
should prohibit the application of sovereign immunity at this stage of the
proceedings after the Secretary’s representation to the court during the
Tribe’s appeal of the temporary restraining order that staying that order
would not deprive the court of jurisdiction.43 This representation,
according to the court, established merely that the court would retain
jurisdiction over the question of whether gaming could occur, not over
whether the APA or QTA and their respective sovereign immunity
waivers should apply.44
V. IMPACT
Sovereign immunity is a fundamental threshold question in any suit
against a state or the federal government. Because it can stand as an
absolute bar to a plaintiff’s cause of action, it is vitally important that

38

Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702).
Id.
40 Id. at 1238.
41 Id. (quoting Kempthorne, 516 F.3d at 845) (“‘[T]he previous orders of this court . .
. are simply irrelevant’ to the question of sovereign immunity.”).
42 Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1238.
43 Id.
44 Id. (quoting Kempthorne, 516 F.3d at 845–46) (“Because waiver must be
unequivocally expressed by Congress, officers of the United States possess no power
through their actions to waive an immunity of the United States or to confer jurisdiction
on a court. The federal government’s appearance in court through its officers and agents,
therefore, does not waive the government’s sovereign immunity . . . .”).
39
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courts establish the contours of this immunity in the many contexts in
which it may arise. In the relationship between Indian tribes and the
federal government, entailing “solemn obligations” and “specific
commitments,”45 this question deserves particular attention.
Moreover, the fact that sovereign immunity of the federal
government is not uniform from one court to the next runs counter to the
entire concept of sovereign immunity. The doctrine is not a court
procedural rule, but an inherent attribute of the sovereign itself.46
Furthermore, waiver of immunity as to a particular issue is accomplished
on a nationwide level, and according to the specific direction of
Congress.47
To remedy this unacceptable confusion between the First Circuit on
the one hand and the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits on the other hand,
the Supreme Court should accept certiorari and affirm that the time-offiling rule fails to do justice to the nature and extent of the immunity
enjoyed by the federal government. This should instead be an ongoing
inquiry, adapting to changing circumstances or directions by Congress
during a suit’s pendency. As Beers instructs, Congress could repeal the
law altogether and divest the courts of jurisdiction if it thought proper to
do so.48 It naturally follows from Beers and from the well-established
sovereign immunity doctrine that the Plaintiffs here have no ability to
sue the government under the QTA, and that the Tenth Circuit’s
dismissal of this action was proper.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs’ appeal that
sovereign immunity should not apply to this case, and that the district
court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper.49 This conclusion
falls on the better-reasoned side of the line dividing the federal circuit
courts on this particular issue, as it comports best with historical
understanding of the sovereign immunity doctrine and is best in line with
all the parties’ expectations. At present, however, there remains a circuit
split on a question that must necessarily have one uniform application
throughout the federal system. The immunity of the United States from
suit must not vary depending on the geographic location of the court
applying the doctrine. Furthermore, the obligations the United States
owes to American Indian tribes warrant particular attention to questions
45
46
47
48
49

Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1237.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1237 n.9.
Beers, 61 U.S. at 530.
Iowa Tribe, 607 F.3d at 1239.
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implicating their right to challenge how the government handles their
lands. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to affirm
the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion in this case and establish one immunity
standard across the entire nation.

